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PREFACE
Gender Lines is a logical outgrowth of our
Women’s Studies Program at La Salle.
In the
spring of 1973, three years after accepting women
into the Day School, the first women’s studies
course was taught. By 1981, a Women's Studies
Concentration had been approved.
Each year some
eight to twelve different women’s studies courses
make gender the center of inquiry for students,
unveiling as poet Carolyn Kizer insists, "merely
the private lives of one half of humanity."
Historian Joan Kelly-Gadol describes how
traditional categories of historical periods seem
insufficient when women's lives and status are
interjected!
"Suddenly we see these ages with a
new double vision— and each eye sees a new
picture." For contemporary poet and critic
Adrienne Rich, the new knowledge about gender is
not simply an intellectual question, but a
personal one:
Re-vision— the act of looking
back, of seeing with fresh
eyes, of entering an old text
from
a
new
critical
direction — is for us more than
a chapter in cultural history;
it is an act of survival.
Until we can understand the
assumptions in which we are
drenched
we
cannot
know
ourselves. . . We need to know
the writing of the past, and
know it differently than we
have ever known it; not to
pass on a tradition but to
break its hold over us.
As faculty teaching women’s studies courses,
we have ourselves been instructed by our students
who have been "seeing with fresh eyes." Aware of
the excellence and originality of much of the

student writing tor our courses, the Women's
Studies Steering Committee in the 1983-1984
academic year, initiated an award tor the best
student critical essay in women's studies.
While
the student might have written the paper tor any
course, submissions were judged on the quality of
their feminist analysis, the logic, style, and
coherence of their writing, and the originality of
conception.
Diane Vari, an English major who
graduated summa cum laude in 1984, won the first
Women's Studies Essay Award tor her essay, "A
Feminist Reading of Catherine Earnshaw."
In 1984-85 we increased the award from $25.00
to $50.00 and committed ourselves to publishing a
student journal in the fall of 1985. We expect to
publish Gender Lines annually from now on.
Twenty-seven student essays were submitted in
1985, nearly triple the amount submitted our first
year. As in the previous year, two faculty
subcommittees were established, one in the Social
Sciences and one in the Humanities.
Student
papers were submitted to the committees tor blind
review. Each subcommittee made recommendations to
the Women's Studies Steering Committee which,
still judging papers without names attached,
agreed on a winning essay.
Our 1985 Women's Studies Essay Prize was
awarded last spring to Lorraine R. Sitler tor her
paper, "The Treatment of Female Status Offenders
by the Juvenile Justice System." Her essay
appropriately opens our issue of Gender Lines.
Six other student essays were chosen tor
publication.
Together they remind us that we are
just beginning to explore the edges of a genuinely
co-educational curriculum, that is, one which
includes data on and perspectives by and about
women as well as men. We hope the essays also
challenge us to explore the complex ways race,
class, and gender intersect.

Like most human achievements, Gender Lines is
the result of collective effort. Gender Lines
could not have been produced without the
commitment and talents of a number of people at La
Salle. We are grateful first for the "double
vision" represented by the twenty-seven essays
submitted by La Salle students. Secondly, we were
dependent on the dedication of the following
faculty members for their generous expenditure of
time in reviewing manuscripts, editing, proofing,
publishing, and distributing Gender Lines; Patty
Coleman, Arleen Dallery, Pat Harrington, Barbara
C. Millard, Caryn McTighe Musi 1, Judith Newton,
and Laura Otten. Finally, we would like to
acknowledge our special debt to Mary Kane, a
senior La Salle student who works in the Women's
Studies Office, for her endurance in typing the
manuscript into a computer that would rather have
eaten the manuscripts than print them.
A Room of One's Own. Virginia Woolf's classic
analysis of patriarchy's stifling effect on
women’s creativity, grew out of a series of
lectures she gave in 1928 to Newnham and Girton
Colleges, the first women’s colleges in England
which are now part of Cambridge University.
Women’s invisibility impeded Woolf’s research.
Little had been documented, about either famous
women or ordinary ones.
In playful selfdeprecation she suggests, "It would be ambitious
beyond my daring, I thought, looking at the
shelves for books that were not there, to suggest
to the students of those famous colleges that they
should re-write history, though I own that it
often seems a little queer as it is, unreal, lop
sided." Gender Lines, the product of students
nearly a half century later, takes up Woolf’s
challenge. Through their re-vision, our
understanding of human beings is a little less
queer, a little less lop-sided.
Caryn McTighe Musil for the
Women’s Studies Steering Committee

1985 WOMEN’S STUDIES ESSAY AWARD WINNER
THE TREATMENT OF FEMALE STATUS OFFENDERS BY THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Lorraine R. Sitler
Juvenile court judges seem to
participate enthusiastically,
though perhaps
unconsciously
in the judicial enforcement of
the female role.
Part of
their
behavior,
while
discriminatory,
is
understandable.
Their legal
background provides them with
clear
guidelines
when
confronting
youths
charged
with crimes.
Standards of
evidence are clear, elements
of the crime are laid down by
statute, and the youth’s civil
rights are at least to some
extent, protected by law. But
in the case of a young woman
charged with incorrigibi1ity
or ungovernability,
the court
is without legal guidelines.
Many of
these judges find
themselves in a legal nevernever land and, in this void,
fall back
on the role of
benevolent but harsh parent,
which is
built
into
the
juvenile justice system.1
This timely quotation from Meda Chesney-Lind
defines the state of the female status offender in
the juvenile court system today. As Gail
Armstrong reiterates, "Most juvenile courts have
broad discretionary powers vested in them by
1

statutes...over a wide variety of juvenile
activity."2 Armstrong further points out that
while these statutes theoretically apply equally
to males and females alike, they actually are
applied "...in accordance with our double
standards of juvenile morality and lend themselves
to discriminatory enforcement against females."3
Datesman and Scarpitti, in a seven month study of
the juvenile court records of an eastern city,
also find a double standard of morality present in
the juvenile justice system. They find that male
judges view female status offenders as sexual
delinquents and thus impose a greater moral
censure upon their activities.
The juvenile court
utilizes its discretionary power in, what the
researchers term "...the service of traditional
sex r o l e s . T h e i r research illuminates the fact
that the juvenile court judges are less concerned
with the protection of the females than with the
protection of the sexual status quo.®
Only in recent years has the entire
disturbing issue of discriminatory treatment
against female status offenders in every stage of
the juvenile justice system been acknowledged in
criminological research.
Eileen Leonard, in her
work on women and crime, outlines some of the
major findings of the last decade or so:
In 1970,
Terry and Cohn found that girls are more likely to
be sentenced to institutions.
Rogers’ study
(1972) of juvenile institutions in Connecticut
noted that 31 per cent of the girls and none of
the boys were institutionalized for non-criminal
offenses (such as being incorrigible) while only
0.05 per cent of the boys were incarcerated for
such offenses. The vast majority of female
offenders (in the courts) were charged with status
violations (Sarri 1976), which are not illegal for
adults and which many states permit only females
to be arrested for (Chesney-Lind 1973).
In
addition, juvenile courts give more severe
dispositions to females even though males are more
frequently involved in serious offenses.
Finally
2

gynecological examinations were ordered for
burglary and larceny offenses, reflecting
society's unrelenting concern with controlling
the sexual activities of minor females as opposed
to those of males (Chesney-Lind).
The wide-spread notion that female status
delinquency means female sexual delinquency
produces unbelievable disparities and abuses
within the juvenile justice system.
In the New
York family court, all girls, even those held on
non-sexual charges, are required to submit to
vaginal smears.
Similarly, here in Philadelphia,
girls brought to the Youth Study Center regardless
of age, are required to submit to an internal
exam.7 When pressed on this issue, the Director
of the Philadelphia Study Center admitted that
those girls who refuse to submit to the exam and
smear are placed in "medical lock-up," a polite
term for solitary confinement.8 Such abuses of
minor females, moreover, are not atypical of the
nation-wide juvenile court response to status
offenders.
The faulty mentality of those who
possess power in the juvenile system, namely
police, probation officers, judges and policy
makers, is largely to blame for these present
injustices. As recently as 1975, Hunter Hurst,
the director of the Juvenile Justice Division of
the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges,
issued the following unenlightened statement
concerning female status offenders:
The issue is that status
offenses are offenses against
our values. Girls are
seemingly over-represented as
status offenders because we
have a strong heritage of
being protective toward
females in this country.
It
offends our sensibility and
our values to have a fourteen
year old girl engage in
3

sexually promiscuous activity.
It's not the way we like to
think about females in this
country. As long as it
offends our values, be sure
that police, or the Church or
vigilante groups, or somebody
is going to do something about
it. For me, I would rather
that something occur in the
court where the rights of the
parties can be protected.9
The legal "protection" for females which Mr.
Hurst assumes to exist in the courts come into
question when the actual practices of the juvenile
court are reviewed. Gail Armstrong, for example,
finds that morality statutes, which exist in many
states, enable the juvenile court to place any
juvenile under custody for almost any act for a
period ranging from six months to eleven years . 10
She succinctly states that juvenile morals
statutes are: "1) unconstitutionally broad because
they encourage selective enforcement against
female juveniles according to a double standard of
sexual morality, 2) unconstitutionally vague, 3)
impermissible in that they punish a status."
These sexually discriminatory statutes suggest
that females need more supervision for a longer
period so that they may be protected from
themselves and their sexuality.12
These morality statutes which are pervasive
but which have come under fire as of late, were
studied in the late 1950's by an enlightened male
who recognized the dangers of the sexually based
standards of the juvenile court. Albert Reiss, in
examining 1500 cases of alleged sexual misbehavior
heard by a metropolitan juvenile court, observed
how stereotypical views of women affected the
outcomes in the cases.
He found that the judge
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...refused to treat any form
of sexual behavior on the part
of boys, even the most bizarre
forms, as warranting more than
probationary status.
The
judge, however, regarded girls
as the ’cause' of sexual
deviation in boys in all cases
of coition involving an
adolescent couple and refused
to hear the complaints of the
girl and her family; the girl
was regarded as a
prostitute.13
The obsession which the juvenile court has
with the sexual conduct, or in fact misconduct, of
juvenile females involves not only behavior
directly related to sexual issues (i.e.
fornication and prostitution), but also the entire
realm of juvenile female delinquency.
The court
has, both blatantly and subtly, revealed that it
sees juvenile female sexuality as the underlying
premise for all female delinquency. Kristine
Rogers, in her 1972 study of a Connecticut
training school, found that the court viewed
females as sexually precocious and attempted to
remedy their precocity through lengthy
incarcerations (girls received an average of 7
months in an institution while the average for
boys was 5 months) as well as through training in
the "womanly arts" (i.e. religion, sewing,
cooking, and beauty culture).14 Yet the archaic
policies of the Connecticut juvenile court have
been candidly discussed by court officials.
One
judge defended his decisions thus: "Why, most of
the girls I commit are for status offenses.
I
figure, if a girl is about to get pregnant, we'll
keep her until she’s sixteen and then ADA (Aid to
Dependent Children) will pick her up."15
Such injustices are not uncommon in the
juvenile system. Most researchers agree that
5

female status delinquency is viewed almost
entirely as sexual delinquency and is more
■frequently and severely punished than male
criminal delinquency.16 In line with this harsh
view, Yona Cohn, in her study of females in the
juvenile court, found that girls who appeared
before the court "usually had committed delinquent
acts against their parents or against sexual
taboos— acts which the probation officer generally
considered as products of social background and
personality makeup."17 Since these acts were,
"beyond the range of effective probation
treatment, sexual delinquents were never
recommended to probation."18
Cohen and Kluegel’s findings, in a 1979
study, reiterate both the notion that female
delinquency is sexual delinquency and that
punishment of these female status offenders is
unreasonably harsh.
The researchers found that
juvenile courts severely punished female alcohol
and drug offenders and virtually overlooked the
same behavior in male offenders.
The courts
defended their discriminatory practices on the
grounds that the use of alcohol and drugs might
lead to sexual promiscuity, voluntary or
involuntary, and thus pregnancy.
The courts
reasoned that they were protecting the girl "from
the possible consequences" by referring her more
often.
Ultimately, their research showed that
females were not doing more; they were just being
referred more than males.20
The seriousness of such inequitable juvenile
court outcomes is obvious and while opinions
cannot be changed solely by legislation, perhaps a
change in the archaic, discriminatory, widely
discretionary juvenile laws would prove a
beneficial first step toward a more solid
resolution. Rosemary Sarri suggests thats
"where
the laws are enforced in a discriminatory manner
in spite of their apparently neutral nature, the
reason is often that the laws are vague or
6

overbroad, so that the double standard of morality
may be applied with impunity."21 She then offers
some of the terms applied to juveniles in legal
statutes as examples:
"...immoral, in danger of
becoming immoral, and moral depravity."22 In much
the same way as Armstrong and Chesney-Lind, Sarri
finds that, "the use of such terms gives no
standards for determining the type of behavior
prescribed; neither the person accused nor the
judge, has any standard on which to base or judge
behavior.2 3
In recent years, progressive steps have been
taken to improve the juvenile delinquency laws.
Two federal court decisions, one in California and
one in New York, have held that statutes which
permitted officials to take custody of juveniles
because they were "in danger of leading an idle,
dissolute, lewd or immoral life" (Gonzalez vs.
Mail l ard 1972) or because they were "in danger of
becoming morally depraved" (Geisicki vs. Oswald
1971) were impermissibly vague.24 As I have
suggested, a change in legal statutes could bring
about a change in the mentality of court
officials, at least as far as their professional
opinions are concerned.
Perhaps, however, a
larger hurdle must be overcome if justice is to
reign in the juvenile justice system.
Ironically, the ideologies which permeate the
juvenile system ("in loco parentis" and "parens
patriae") and which are expressed in the act of
protecting the ’daughters' of the court, find
their roots with another problematic group— the
biological parents.
The behavior of the juvenile
court personnel, moreover, might be controlled by
more equitable edicts, but the behavior and rights
of the natural parent are subject to many fewer
legalities. Hence, parents have nearly unlimited
rights and powers concerning a juvenile.
It would seem too, that parents and the
juvenile courts work in collusion against the
female status offender.
Armstrong makes the
7

•following observations Many females who step
outside the expected sex roles are adjudicated
because of parental pressure.
Juvenile courts are
highly concerned with obedience to parents
especially on the part of a daughter.
Thus,
because parents have different expectations of
sons and daughters, the juvenile court responds
differently to male and female offenders.25
Teilmann and Landry similarly conclude that
female status offenders
probably are
disproportionately represented
in police, probation, court
and institutional populations.
Furthermore, this
representation is probably the
result of different societal
expectations of girls compared
with boys, but the weight of
this difference is likely to
result from parents more than
from the system since (in
their study) disposition
decisions were not obviously
or consistently biased after
we controlled for offense type
and prior record.26
While the bulk of their findings are not
consistent with previous research, they, too,
recognize the major influence that parents have
over the control of the juvenile in the juvenile
justice system.
William Barton also finds that girls fare
worse in the hands of the system basically because
of the sex-role stereotypes that people cling to:
"Boys will be boys and are expected to engage in a
certain amount of mischief, some of which may be
delinquent...but for girls, delinquent behavior is
viewed as a more serious problem."28 The strict
8

and rigorous patterns of behavior that society, in
the person of the parents, requires from minor
females tends to spill over into juvenile court
affairs with inordinant frequency.
Thus ChesneyLind, in researching judicial paternalism, found
that "referral rates are higher for verbal abuse
than for assault; a refusal to obey and coming
home late will get you before a judge more quickly
than arson or illegal entry." 29
Cohen and Kleugal, in their comparison study
of the Denver and Memphis juvenile courts,
similarly found that a female is more likely to be
detained for a decorum offense because she is more
likely to be referred by her parents.30
Furthermore, in a New York study, researchers
found that, "to intake officers, parental
objection to a daughter’s boyfriend (64 per cent
of the referred cases) was more serious than a
charge of larceny (57 per cent of the cases
referred.)31 One final indignity that Conway and
Bogdan elicited is that
in (1976) alone, 100,000
juveniles were committed to
rehabilitative agencies ...of
this number, almost 60 per
cent were detained solely on
the suggestion of parents or
school officials before having
a formal hearing with a judge.
In most instances, the actual
violation of a legal statute
was unnecessary.32
Such biased behavior in detaining females
carries over into the realm of incarceration.
Chesney-Lind, for example, finds the reasoning
that Kratcoski presents for detaining females
without judicial referral seriously faulty.
Girls, according to Kratcoski, can be detained if
they are picked up as runaways and if parents
cannot be reached immediately.
Kratcoski reasons
9

that if the girl cannot be returned to her own
home and if she "...[-finds] the detention center
environment more comfortable and less threatening
than her own home," she should remain there.33 He
concludes that "what may appear to be differential
treatment of female offenders may in fact be the
juvenile [system’s] response to girls’ special
needs and its utilization of the limited
alternatives available."34 In essence, ChesneyLind finds that Kratcoski defends punitive
incarceration on the basis of the females’ "need."
This protective rationale might seem
plausible until additional data are considered.
Chesney-Lind, for example, finds that, despite the
fact that young women generally pose no threat to
community well-being, they are comparatively
underrepresented in non-incarceratory shelters and
farms. Secondly, she finds that "the conditions
in the nation’s detention facilities are by no
means characterized by the protective atmosphere
described by proponents of the practice of
detaining young women."35 Females in the New York
Family Court are not only detained for longer
periods than are males but for the most part are
housed in merely custodial institutions with no
rehabilitative philosophy.36 Finally this notion
that females need protection from themselves
allows for discrepancies between the permissible
length of confinement in "treatment" or
"rehabilitative" institutions.37 Statistics,
moreover, tend to support Chesney-Lind’s view of
incarceration patterns.
A report in the mid1970’s by the Juvenile Justice Task Group noted
that "...fully 70 per cent of females held by the
courts could be labelled as status offenders as
they had not been charged with committing either a
misdemeanor or a felony."38 The National
Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, working out of
the University of Michigan, found that not only
are females disproportionately committed for
status offenses, but that in the institutionalized
population, fully "50 per cent of the females were
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there for status offenses."
It also found that
"in all cases, females were committed
disproportionately for offenses (i.e. status,
drug) that had little if any relationship to
protection of the community.
Vet they were placed
in institutions more frequently and held for
longer periods."39 It stands to reason that most
of these incarcerated female status offenders were
detained and institutionalized for behavior which
was not consistent with societal role expectations
rather than for behavior which was legally defined
as criminal.
A sub-category of juveniles who are also at
the mercy of their parents and the courts and are
treated as harshly as felons by both, are the
Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS). Milton
Rector, in his research on PINS, finds this a
vicious cycle:
"A 'considerable majority' of PINS
petitions are filed by the children's mothers
ostensibly because the youngsters are beyond
control."40 However, Rector states, children
often become status offenders by running away from
home because of brutal or alcoholic parents:
"One
of the major reasons for girls running away is to
avoid sexual abuse from their fathers, their
stepfathers or their mother’s boyfriends."41
Conway and Bogdan also find that PINS can be
remanded to a facility for an indeterminant period
and that "...a girl who is promiscuous can be
legally detained longer than a boy of comparable
age who has committed a serious felony."42 The
researchers attribute such a finding to this
underlying issue — the courts, like good parents,
are detaining females for their own good. More
notably, although one-half of all minors are given
felony-length incarcerations each year for such
activities as being ungovernable and, in the case
of females, promiscuous, none of the regulations
that apply to felons apply to the girl.43
The status offender, therefore, particularly
the female status offender and the female PINS,
11

are injured by a double-edged sword.
Both parents
and the courts, acting "as good parents," work
together to punish, and severely punish, their
daughters for, as Conway and Bogdan state
"...doing little more than offending their
community’s sense of propriety.
A
"s Gail
Armstrong put it,
Special sentencing statutes,
sentencing judges, and
society’s conception of the
female sex role are all
responsible for the unjust
sentencing of females.
The
disparate sentences received
by males and females found
guilty of the same offenses
provide the most blatant
evidence of this unequal
treatment.
Special sentencing
statutes enacted at the turn
of the century to ’protect’
women, deny them their
fundamental rights.45
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LINDA:

A WOMAN ENTRAPPED BY FANTASY
Stacy Michelle Kaplan

In examining Katherine Mansfield's two short
stories entitled "Prelude," and "At The Bay," one
sees that Linda becomes dependent upon her
■fantasies in order to ensure her own psychological
health. She wishes to reject motherhood, as well
as other domestic qualities which were
characteristic of the average woman and it is in
her dreams that she expresses her sense of
entrapment:
Suddenly he
bent down and
parted the grasses and showed
her a tiny ball of fluff just
at her feet....
She made a
cup of her hands and caught
the tiny bird and stroked its
head with her finger.
It was
quite tame.
But a funny thing
happened.
As she stroked it
began to swell, it ruffled and
pouched, it grew bigger and
bigger and
its round eyes
seemed to smile knowingly at
her. Now her arms were hardly
wide enough to hold it and she
dropped it into her apron.
It
had become a baby with a big
naked head and a gaping birdmouth, opening and shutting.
Her father broke into a loud
clattering laugh and she woke
to see Burnell standing by the
windows...("Prelude," 65.)
Linda’s dream begins very innocently, as do
her ideas about love, marriage, and sexuality.
She is ignorant of the confinement her sensuality
can eventually have upon her, that confinement

being motherhood, and yet the literary terminology
used within this passage is very suggestive of
pregnancy and the period of growth it encompasses.
The image of the "gaping bird-mouth" reflects the
all-consuming demands she will encounter from her
children, for Linda’s responsibility will be to
nurture her newborn child, placing her own
priorities last. As time passes, moreover, she
will continue to lose more and more control over
her own life and desires.
Perhaps, however, Linda never really had any
control over her own life at all. Most women at
that time did not, for they were shuffled from
their family home to the home of their new
husband.
I emphasize the word "husband" since all
property soon became his. Evidence of this lack
of control, for example, may be found in both of
these stories, in the effect Stanley’s presence
has upon Linda’s actions, as well as upon those of
other women. For example, on moving day Stanley’s
slippers, considered an "urgent necessity," are
deemed more important than their own childrens
"We shall simply have to leave them [the
children]. That is all. We shall simply have to
cast them off," said Linda Burnell.
A strange
little laugh flew from her 1ips"("Prelude," 53).
Overbearing male presence is again referred to in
the following passages:
Linda did not rest again until
the final slam of the front
door told her that Stanley was
really
gone
("Prelude,"
67)...Oh, the
relief,
the
difference it made to have the
man out of the house.
Their
very voices were changed as
they called to one another;
they sounded warm and loving
and as
if they
shared a
secret("At The Bay," 106)...
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At these times, Linda can be herself.
She doesn’t
have to exaggerate her physical limitations in
order to build up Stanley’s ego. The stylish
image of frailty and sickness has left Linda pale
and aggressively weak, but now the women could
come together as comrades, without fear of
infringement by their suppressors.
Linda’s fantasy about the bird also echoes a
sense of betrayal by her father. She had believed
her father to be the exception to all the other
men. However, his "loud clattering laugh" proves
him to be a fellow conspirator with the rest of
the male gender. Linda also finds the selection
of her husband an affirmation of her father’s
control over her:
"...Linda’s father pulled her
ear teasingly, in the way he had.
’Linney’s
beau,’ he whispered.
’Oh papa, fancy being
married to Stanley Burnell!’" ("At The Bay,"
115). On a macrocosmic level of interpretation,
Linda’s bird fantasy suggests that reproduction
means the perpetuation of women's subordination,
and in particular, that it is male children who
eventually suppress their own mothers. Men rule
women’s lives. Linda’s husband even watches her
while she sleeps, guarding her as if to prevent
any possible threat to his male supremacy.
Linda experiences a few isolated moments of
superiority, and at these times, she is linked
with nature to emphasise women’s oneness with it.
Women draw their strength from nature’s roots.
"The manuka tree, bent by the southernly winds,
was like a bird on one leg stretching out a wing"
("At The Bay," 134). Here the bird image
symbolizes Linda’s attempt to escape the pressure
of male influences.
It appears that under the
manuka tree this is possible, for we visualize
Linda stronger and more independent within this
setting. For instance, Linda appears to be the
successful party in her meeting with Jonathan.
It
is his life that seems haphazard in direction,
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whereas Linda's life looks at least
materialistical1y desirable.
Linda experiences another moment of power in
the scene with her son under the manuka tree. As
an infant her son is dependent upon his mother for
nurturance, and Linda’s rejection of her son
enables her to display a sense of power over him:
"I don’t like babies" ("At The Bay," 116).
However, her supposedly absent maternal instinct
also surfaced:
"...it was something far
different, it was something so new,
....The tears
danced in her eyes; ...but by now the boy had
forgotten his mother. He was serious again...He
made a tremendous effort and rolled right over"
("At The Bay," 117). Once Linda begins to
understand the potential joys of motherhood, she
is rejected by her son. The child’s ability to
roll over is far more important to him than
dealing with the petty inconveniences of his
mother.
It is as if she were no longer important.
Symbolically, this implies that males really do
not see women as necessary to such important
issues as their growth and increasing control over
their environment. Women need only menial tasks
to keep them happy; or so men believe.
Linda’s next fantasy also focuses on the
theme of escape:
Her clothes
lay across
a
chair— her outdoor things,
a
purple cape and a round hat
with a plume in it. Looking
at them she wished that she
was going
away from
this
house, too.
And she saw
herself driving away from them
all in a little buggy, driving
away from everybody and not
even waving.... He pitched the
wet towel on top of her hat
and cape ("Prelude," 66.)
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Experience has shown her the course her life will
take in time and Linda desires to throw it away
•for a life void of men and children.
Stanley,
however, demonstrates his belief that Linda’s
ideas are trivial by throwing a wet towel on top
of her outdoor clothing. He has no respect for
her belongings or her fantasies, and once again
his dominant position in her life is represented.
The fact that it is her outdoor clothing that gets
ruined symbolizes Stanley’s desire for Linda to
remain bound to domestic life. He will dampen her
hopes for escape.
Indeed, he is the obstacle that
keeps her desires mere fantasy:
...that was her real grudge
against life; that was what
she could
not
understand.
That was
the question she
asked and asked and listened
in vain for the answer.
It
was all very well to say it
was the common lot of women to
bear children.
It wasn’t
true.
She, for one, could
prove that wrong.
She was
broken, made weak, her courage
was
gone,
through
chil dbearing.
And what made
it doubly hard was she did not
love her children.
It was
useless pretending...("At The
Bay,” 116.)
Stanley, although a loving husband, appears
insensitive and ignorant to Linda’s needs as a
woman, and this passage displays the biting and
radical feelings some women hold with respect to
motherhood.
Opinions such as these, however, even
though silent, are very threatening to the status
quo. Thus, both Linda and Stanley continue living
within separate worlds, only to come together
during sex.
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Linda's attempt to be heard by Stanley is
symbolized by the reference to his ears in the
following passage:
"...'What have you got in your
button-hole - cherries?'
She took them out and
hung them over his ears...so she took them off his
ear again.
'You don't mind if I save them.
They'd spoil my appetite for dinner'"
("Prelude, "p. 78) Linda hangs both cherries on his
ear because she needs to discuss the lack of
equality within their relationship.
Unsuccessful,
she later removes the cherries.
This passage also
has sexual implications, for it seems as if Linda
attempts to reclaim her virginity by holding onto
the cherries.
If she eats them, her appetite will
be spoiled, just as her marriage became less
appealing when her virginity was lost and she
became only the object of Stanley's desire.
As
Linda continues to put Stanley off, she is
identified with the cold, pale, virginal moon.
Another fantasy of Linda’s reminds one of the
narrator’s experience in "Yellow Wallpaper" by
Charlotte Gilman. Both women alone in their rooms
discover an added dimension within the wallpaper
surrounding them:
She turned over to the wall
and idly, with one finger, she
traced
a
poppy
on
the
wallpaper with a leaf and a
stem and a fat bursting bud
the poppy
seemed to
come
alive...the strangest part of
this coming alive of things
was what
they did.
They
listened, they seemed to swell
out
with
some
mysterious
important content,
and when
they were full she felt that
they smiled.
But it was not
for her,
only, their
sly
secret
smile;
they
were
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members of a secret society
and
they
smiled
among
themselves...("Prelude,"
689).
The wallpaper comes alive with this poppy image,
but this reference to nature, appears to employ
all male imagery. The poppy seed as a bud is a
phallic symbol. Although Linda touches it, and it
becomes swollen and full, she is just as removed
from this experience as she is from her sexuality
with Stanley.
The buds share a secret that Linda
is excluded from. The origin of their secret is
not clear, however.
It might refer to children or
perhaps the existing conspiracy between the men of
this story.
The "Yellow Wallpaper" also reflects a series
of women trapped within the walls of their gender
revealing a female bond among the women as well as
a characteristic isolation. Maybe like the
narrator of the "Yellow Wallpaper" Linda is on the
verge of a mental breakdown. Immersed deeply
within the realm of fantasy, Linda will free
herself from the stereotypical role of wife and
mother, but isn't the cost of sanity a high price
to pay? Mansfield does not allow the reader to
come to any conclusive answers. Her sporadic,
fragmented scenes only give the reader clues as to
the real meaning which lies within them.
Mansfield's stories also share a common
denominator with Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's
Own. Both works stress at one point the
importance to a woman of possessing her own room
in order to achieve success: "And everything, even
the bedpost, knows you, responds, shares your
secret.... You're not very fond of your room by
day. You never think about it...it's suddenly
dear to you....
It's yours. Oh, what a joy it is
to own things. Mine - my own!" ("At The Bay,"
133). Linda's opportunity to find her true self
comes when she acquires this room. Although the

room isn't completely hers, the time she has in it
alone is precious. The room may symbolize Linda's
■finding a sense of worth. However, it is evident
that she occupies her dominion only when she can
sneak a few moments away from Stanley.
For
instance, Linda finds the late, late night hours
to be "...as though you were slowly, almost with
every breath, waking up into a new wonderful, far
more thrilling and exciting world than the
daylight one" ("At The Bay," 133). A room of
one's own is also a popular image of the freedom
and power of a woman alone. But society looks at
an individual's worth in terms of their material
accomplishments. Since Stanley owns the entire
house, and Linda doesn't even own one whole room,
she is once again forced to assume a subservient
role to Stanley.
Nature imagery plays an important role in
Mansfield stories.
There is a very close identity
between females and nature, the earth and its
products. Man destroys nature by pollution, and
man destroys woman by waste.
...she looked up at the dark,
close, dry
leaves of
the
manuka....
Each pale yellow
petal shone as if each was the
careful work of a loving hand.
The tiny tongue in the center
gave it the shape of a bell.
And when you turned it over
the outside was a deep bronze
colour.
But as soon as they
flowered, they fell and were
scattered....
Who takes the
trouble-or they joy-to make
all these
things that are
wasted...It was
uncanny....
If only one had time to look
at these flowers long enough,
time to get over the sense of
novelty and strangeness, time
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to know them! But as soon as
one paused to part the petals,
to discover the underside of
the leaf, along came Life and
one was swept away.
And,
lying in her cane chair, Linda
felt so light; she felt like a
leaf.
Along came Life like a
wind and she was seized and
shaken; she had to go.
Oh
dear, would it always be so?
Was there no escape" ("At The
Bay," 114-5)?
Here Linda visualizes herself as flowers, but
she is deflowered through Stanley's sexuality.
It
is he who seizes her "like the wind," thereby
disallowing her escape from the seemingly
inevitable cycle— promise, exploitation,
consummation, and ultimate destruction. Linda
realized that because men view women as "novelty
or strangeness" they keep them suppressed, for men
fear what they do not understand.
It is for this
reason they consider females inferior. This was
"Life." Life wasted women. Life is wasting
Linda. She longs for freedom, freedom to be a
woman independent of her sex. She wants equality
in the world of male supremacy.
The aloe, finally, seems to be Linda's way of
defining herself.
"I like that aloe:
I like it
more than anything here.
I am sure I shall
remember it long after I’ve forgotten all the
other things" ("Prelude," 93). Linda’s sense of
womanhood is characterized by this plant, for she
must maintain a secretive sense of self worth in
order to protect herself from society.
She had
been "split and broken;...withered" from her
experiences of childbirth ("Prelude," 74). Now,
her only protection lies in the "long, sharp
thorns" to ward off submission to her
"Newfoundland dog Stanley" ("Prelude," 93,92).
Beneath her curling leaves she hides the true
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thoughts, hopes, and desires of an imprisoned
woman awaiting her escape ("Prelude," 75).
Although she appears submissive and beaten, she
waits dormantly for her flower to bloom.
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VIOLENT PORNOGRAPHY AGAINST WOMEN:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND CHOICES OF THE FILMMAKER
Anita M. Mastroieni
Violent pornography is a growing concern of
many feminist and community groups. The effect
that violent pornography has on society is still
being debated, but many of these groups contend
that its effects are detrimental. Unfortunately,
there are no national guidelines as to the content
of violent pornography, and ultimately, content is
decided upon by the producers of violent
pornograpy themselves.
How they choose this
content could very well affect the future of the
entire industry.
"Pornography has come to occupy its own niche
in the communications and entertainment media,"
writes Helen Longino.1
Indeed, pornography
appears in all types of media: literature,
periodicals, television’s cable channels, and
film. But film has been singled out as the
vehicle for pornography to be studied in this
paper. There are two reasons for this selection.
First, there is the impact, past and present, that
film potentially has on mass audiences.
Annette
Kuhn suggests that "The close-up fast-cutting, the
sophistication of modern make-up and special
effects techniques, the heightening effect of
sound effects and music all combine on the large
screen to produce an impact which no other medium
can create."2
Secondly, pornographic film is more socially
visible than other media. In order to purchase
hard-core books or magazines, one must enter a
special shop or section of a shop. One must
subscribe to pornographic cable channels to
receive them. But one need only walk down New
York's 42nd Street or Philadelphia's Market Street
to be subjected to graphic advertisements and
29
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suggestive titles of currently-playing movies.
After all, there are an estimated 900 x-rated
movie theaters in the United States today.3 Even

A Brief History of Violent Pornography
Erotic and pornographic films have been with
us since cinema was first developed.
As early as
the thirties, feature-length films were devoted to
the depiction of the naked body, male and female.
But it wasn't until the mid-sixties that violent
pornography took to the screen. Russ Meyers is
credited with releasing the first nationally
distributed feature-length "Roughie," as violent
pornography used to be called. His movie, Lorna,
"created a vogue for Gothic dramas in which sex
took second place to violence."8 In their book,
Sinema, Turan and Zito discuss the sex-andviolence films that became popular with
exploitation filmmakers during the sixties:
They feature
rape, murder,
dismemberment
and
disfigurement,
torture
and
kidnapping,
domination and
flagellation,
bondage
and
leather orgies...The icons of
this genre are boots, chains,
ropes, knives, hatchets,
and
all lethal
instruments, both
sharp and
blunt, and the
characters are motivated by
lust
and
avarice...Blood
rather than semen becomes the
symbolic
fluid
of
erotic
expression.9
Turan and Zito go on to explain that these films,
"featuring neither complete nudity nor loving
sexual contact, were largely exempt from the wrath
of the censors."10
Pornographic film audiences having quickly
become tired of conventional sex and sexual
fantasies on the screen, sent producers searching
for new taboos to depict on film. Violent
pornography was a logical outcome.
Today, some
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believe that audiences have become bored with the
S-M rituals of violent pornography. In 1980, for
example, Screw magazine conducted an "informal"
survey among audiences of pornographic films to
find out what they preferred to see in their
pornography.11 According to the survey, violence
and rape were low on the list of preferences, and
anal intercourse was highest.
Joseph W. Slade, in
his essay, "Recent Trends in Pornographic Films,"
concluded that audiences are no longer interested
in violence. He later listed some reasons why
anal intercourse might be preferred: "There is
pain (real or feigned) expressed on the faces of
women participants...and anal intercourse often
sublimates male homosexuality and hostility toward
females. "14 It seems fairly obvious, however,
that audiences today are not at all bored with
violence, but that they are tired of the usual
violent fare, and are looking for violence
manifested in different ways. There is still a
sizeable amount of degradation in a depiction of a
woman uncomfortably or painfully submitting to a
sexual encounter.
Historically, legislation concerning
pornography has either been thoroughly stringent
or vague and ambiguous.
Much of today’s
legislation on pornography is based on the
findings of the President’s Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography, which published its
results in 1970. The Commission made no
distinctions between violent pornography and non
violent pornography, but instead defined
"pornography" as "the degrading and demeaning
portrayal of the role and status of the human
female...as a mere sexual object to be exploited
and manipulated sexually."13 Despite the highly
unflattering picture of pornography's effect on
society that this definition paints, the final
conclusion of the Commission was that there was no
relationship between exposure to pornography and
subsequent antisocial behavior.1*^
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In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
the Miller decision, which, in effect, permitted
states and cities to establish their own
"community standards" regarding the definition of
obscenity. The Court developed a three-part test
for obscenity: 1) whether an average person,
applying "contemporary community standards" would
find the work in question prurient: 2) whether the
work is a "patently offensive" depiction of sexual
conduct specifically proscribed by state law; and
3) whether the work, taken as a whole, "lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."15 The basic result of this
decision is that smaller cities and towns have
some control over the pornography market in their
commmunity, while in the larger cities,
pornography thrives on designated "strips." In
May of 1984, President Reagan announced that
Attorney General William French Smith would soon
set up a new national commission to study the
effects of pornography on society.16
Unknown as
of now are who will be on the commission, how it
will be conducted, and when the results will be
publis hed.
Research on the Effects of Pornography
Despite the claims of the 1970 President’s
Commmission on Obscenity and Pornography, some
researchers are still looking into the effects
that pornography has on its viewers and society in
general.
The results are divided; some will say
there are no antisocial or otherwise adverse
effects from violent pornographic films, and some
will say there are. One can say that most of the
conclusions spring from the researcher’s own
presuppositions, and not necessarily from the
data. Or, one can say that the data can be
interpreted in different ways, and that the
researcher interprets according to his/her own
hypothesi s.
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Robert Stoller writes, for example, that "No
depiction is pornographic until an observer’s
fantasies are added; nothing is pornographic per
se."17 Depending on the individual’s fantasies,
the effect may be harmful, healthy, or neither.
"Typically, annoyed individuals shown an arousing
film are more aggressive than those shown a non
arousing film," conclude Mueller and Donnerstein
in their experiments.18 If an individual is
predisposed to misogyny, perhaps only he will
respond to violent pornography overtly, while
others would not. Later research, however, does
claim to show that exposure to "sexually violent
pornography" may lead to "antisocial behaviors" in
most viewers. These behaviors include an increase
in: "an acceptance of rape myths, a willingness of
a man to say he would commit a rape, and
aggressive behavior toward women in a laboratory
setting; and a decrease in one’s sensitivity to
rape and rape victims...(and) in conclusion, there
is a loss of sensitivity to real violence after
repeated exposure to films with sex and
violence."19 Still many recent researchers claim
that violent pornography has no adverse effects,
or unprovable adverse effects on the veiwer’s
attitudes and behaviors.
Obviously, there are no
clear answers.
Feminist Arguments Against Pornography
Despite these contradictory findings many
feminists condemn pornography as harmful to women.
In her essay entitled "Pornography, Oppression and
Freedom: A Closer Look," for example, Helen
Longino lists three ways that pornography is
injurious to women.2° The first, she writes, is
that "violent pornography is implicated in the
committing of crimes of violence against women."
Secondly, pornography is the "vehicle for the
dissemination of a deep and vicious lie about
women." Sociologist Diana E. H. Russell, for
example, writes that pornography "ideologically
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establishes that a woman's innermost wish is to
subject herself to men. "21
Finally, Longino claims that pornography is
injurious to women in that "it supports sexist
attitudes and reinforces the oppression and
exploitation of women. "22 Susan Brownmiller, for
example, writes that, "There can be no ’equality'
in porn, no female equivalent... Pornography, like
rape, is a male invention"23 and Longino explains
that "even men who do not frequent pornographic
shops and movies are supported in the sexist
objectivication of women by their environment. "24
Indeed, many, although not all, feminists
view pornography as anti-female propaganda.
Beverly LaBelle, for example, in her essay, "The
Propanganda of Misogyny," cites eight techniques
universally employed in propaganda campaigns (as
outlined by J.A.C. Brown in Techniques of
Persuasion.)2 5 She then explains how each
technique is employed in violent pornography.
These eight techniques are;
1) Use of stereotypes
(women are virgins or carnal women); 2) Name
substitution (women are routinely referred to as
"tramp," "bitch," "cunt," etc., but rarely as
human beings); 3) Selection (only one side of
women's sexuality is depicted, contrary to the
findings of The Hite Report which claims that
women's sexuality is multi-faceted); 4) Lying
(pornography lies about women’s sexuality, i.e.
pain equals pleasure, etc.); 5) Repetition (the
idea that women wish to be subject to men appears
in most forms of violent pornography); 6)
Assertion (pornography is present everywhere in
society; therefore its themes and ideas can be
proclaimed everywhere); 7) Pinpointing the enemy
(women are the enemy, they are the group to be
subdued); and 8) Appeal to authority (testimonies
from experts that pornography is not harmful give
pornography a sense of respectability).26
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There are those, of course, who see feminist
arguments against pornography as wrong.
They
believe violent pornography does not degrade women
as a chief function.
Turan and Zito, for example,
write that "the more explicit the pornography, the
less competent and powerful the man appears.
Women can much more easily simulate sexual arousal
and capability...The fantasy may be male
chauvanist, but the performance clearly
establishes the female superiority."27 Joseph W.
Slade also claims that "clearly many porn features
degrade women. Equally clearly, many do not,
simply because the female must at least sometimes
be the male's equal or his superior...
Obviously, there is some debate on the amount of
actual violence against women and the portrayal of
women as inferior.
But, one might ask, if men are
given "equal time," as it were, is pornography no
longer harmful to women? According to Susan
Brownmiller, the consistent combination of
violence and sex, or domination and sex on film
can be harmful, no matter who the perpetrator is.
"The glorification of forced sex under slavery,
institutional rape...is doing irreparable damage
to healthy sexuality.
Are There Any Redeeming Qualities to Violent
Pornography?
There are also those who look for and find
redeeming qualities in violent pornography.
A
common school of thought, expressed by Goldstein
and Kant in Pornography and Sexual Deviancy, is
that "trends of thought that one generation may
consider seditious, obscene, and/or heretical are
often recognized as the 'great lights of
civilization' by the next."30 In this respect,
pornography is seen as avant-garde and socially
instructional, ahead of its time. But isn't it
possible that pornography will finally reach a
point when it becomes so obscene and seditious,
that no generation will ever embrace it? How far
does pornography have to go before it is
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universally rejected by all "following generations?
Nearly ten years ago a film entitled "Snuff" was
released, a highly publicized movie which
purported to show actual murder and dismemberment
of a woman.31 Will this movie be one of the
"great lights of civilization" of the next
generation? It appears that some forms of violent
pornography will not be embraced by the next
generation as anything except a sick artifact of
times before.
Another argument for pornography is presented
by Robert Stoller: "Pornography is for
restitution; its creation and its use are
ritualized acts, and deviation from a narrow,
prescribed path will produce decreased sexual
excitement."32 This has been the argument in
favor of pornography since its beginning, but
there is no way to prove or disprove it, since
many outside factors contribute to sexual
excitement as well. Finally, Joseph W. Slade
provides one more argument in favor of
pornography:
"Despite its erosion in society at
large and in the 'legitimate' film, the taboo
against graphic abuse of females is holding (in
pornographic film)."33 It seems impossible,
however, that this is true. One trip down 42nd
Street, reading poster-boards for movies promising
"all," movies with titles like "Blood Feast,"
"Snuff," and "Faster, Pussycat, Kill, Kill!,"
should suggest that the graphic abuse of women
(and children and men) is thriving in today's
pornography market.
i

Does the First Amendment Apply to Pornography?
Despite all the research that claims violent
pornography can be harmful, however, it is
protected under the First Amendment.
Freedom of
speech in this country is one of the most sacred
of all rights, and it is not easy to prove who or
what does not deserve the right to that freedom.
However, some groups have developed substantial
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arguments against violent pornography's protection
under the First Amendment.
Many feminists, -for
example, agree that pornography is an abuse of the
right to freedom of speech. Several types of
speech are not protected by the First Amendment.
Solicitation of crimes, perjury, slander, libel,
and false advertising are a few examples, and many
feminists contend that pornography should not be
protected by the First Amendment, either.
According to Helen Longino "the manufacture and
distribution of material which defames and
threatens all members of a class by its
recommendation of abusive and degrading behavior
toward some members of that cl ass...seems a clear
candidate for inclusion on the list" of speeches
not protected by the First Amendment.34
Diana E.H. Russell admits that "banning
pornography would probably just create a black
market, but it is better to have it underground
than to see it as an accepted part of our
culture."35 As noted previously, the acceptance
of pornography by the public media implies a
cultural endorsement of its message. To have
violent pornography exist solely on the black
market is to imply that society does not endorse
nor encourage the degradation and violence of
women. Some feminist writers, however, believe
that pornography's protection under the First
Amendment is a necessity in order to preserve all
freedoms and combat repression.
Thus Jean Bethke
Elshtain writes that "consistent overstatement of
the problem and underplaying of the repressive
potential in suggested solutions characterize much
of the literature of the anti-pornography
crusade. "36
Filmmakers;
Choices

Their Responsibilities and Their

No matter what one believes the outcome
should be, for the present pornography is
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protected by the First Amendment and violent
pornography is thriving in metropolitan areas.
As long as this is true it is the filmmakers
who have the chief say in what goes in and what
stays out of pornographic films. This power,
moreover, should not be underestimated.
"In
realizing communal sexual fantasies— views of
sex— pornographic films have, in turn, helped to
shape and change those views.
In terms of sheer
numbers they cannot help but have some effect,"
write Turan and Zito.'37, If this is true, if
violent pornography is indeed shaping the sexual
views of society, then some of our sexual views at
least are being constructed by the motivations and
attitudes of a few filmmakers.
Money, of course, is the main motivtion of
the pornographic filmmaker.
"Liberal pieties have
little to do with the real business of the porn
film...," contends Joseph W. Slade.38 The real
business of violent pornography has to do with
money, with pleasing the male heterosexuals who
make up 90% of the market.39 Certainly,
filmmakers would not be producing violent
pornography if there were not a market for it.
However, the fact that audiences desire violent
pornography should not excuse filmmakers from
taking responsibility for what they contribute to
society in the form of films. Helen Longino,
moreover, suggests that reform of pornography
films is possible. Film, which provides a
temporal context for its actions, is easily able
to upgrade socially unredeemable violent
pornography:
"In showing the before and after, a
filmmaker has plenty of opportunity to acknowledge
the dignity of the person violated or clearly
refuse to do so. "40 The filmmaker who depicts a
woman who is raped, transformed into an insatiable
nymphomaniac, and then is eternally grateful to
her rapist, has not acknowledged that woman’s
dignity, but the filmmaker who depicts a woman who
is raped, and is violated and hurt by that action,
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and who must recover and bring that rapist to
trial, has made an attempt to acknowledge that
dignity.
The first woman, of course, is a stereotype
and the second woman is "real," but it is time
that filmmakers of violent pornography begin to
use "real" characters in their films.
Indeed, the
use of real characters would appease many of the
groups that are currently critical of violent
pornographic films. Real characters have dignity.
Real characters evoke sympathy when hurt. Real
characters evoke dislike when they
violate/degrade/abuse other characters.
Stereotypes cannot do the same. And yet real
characters in real situations can be just as
erotic, stimulating, and even as "kinky" as
stereotypes in stereotypical situations.
The
difference is that no lies are being perpetrated.
Shere Hite’s national study indicates that the
majority of actual women do not wish to be subject
to actual men.41 But if, from boyhood, a male is
exposed to violent pornography, what else can he
beli eve?
Producers of pornographic films, moreover,
should be able to make stimulating films with real
characters and make money as well. Filmmakers, of
course, will argue that there is a market for
violence and degradation.
But if they produced
violent and degrading films using real characters,
that type of film would prove very shocking and
brutal to the majority of the audience.
Then in
all probability, the market for violence would
soon diminish. According to Joseph W. Slade
"...without the cut-out characters and the erotic
templates, film pornography would probably be
intolerable to those who enjoy it most."42 But
without the cut-out stereotypes, filmmakers would
be able to produce what pornography was originally
supposed to bet stimulating and arousing
depictions of various sexual encounters between
real people.
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Filmmakers, moreover, do not have to lose
their audience by producing this kind of film. On
the contrary, they might even increase their
audiences. As states previously, men make up
close to 100’
/. of the pornographic film audience.
But pornography using real characters, pornography
in which neither party is robbed of dignity, would
be more likely to attract women as well, because
it would be less male-oriented. Indeed,
pornography without a specific gender orientation
might prove to be more profitable to
pornographers, as it would begin to attract an
entire segment of the popultion that has thus far
been ignored.
How likely is it, however, that a widespread
reform such as the one proposed could take place
within the pornograhic film industry? In all
probability, it is not very likely. Even if the
use of "real" characters could make money, most
filmmakers probably would not want to change
tactics, nor see the need to change them. There
must be some other kind of "incentive" for the
filmmaker of violent pornography, and this
"incentive" exists in the form of that sector of
the feminist movement, which is against
pornography.
This sector, intact, has one of the
most organized campaigns against pornography
today. By publishing literature, staging
protests, filing civil rights suits, and becoming
involved in politics, this sector is growing in
numbers and is creating quite a bit of publicity.
And they are being strengthened by religious and
community groups whose anti-pornography campaigns
strive for the same goal— to end social acceptance
of violent pornography.
Of course, acceptance of
violent pornography is stronger today than any
anti-pornography movement, but slowly, this may
change. The anti-pornography movement is not
going away; and most groups are determined to work
until their goal is reached.
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It seems, therefore, that the filmmakers of
violent pornography have a choice.
They can begin
an industry-wide reform of their films, or they
can continue as they have been and combat the
anti-pornography movement.
There is, however, a
third potential outcome. More and more feminists
are getting involved in politics, and their
arguments against the protection of pornography
under the First Amendment are quite substantial.
The new President's Commission on Pornography may
publish results which contradict those of a decade
and a half ago and it is possible that violent
pornography may one day fall from the complete
protection that it currently enjoys under the
First Amendment. Certainly, this kind of radical
change would take years to come about, but it is
possible.
Although it is unlikely that pornography will
ever be entirely banned in this country, feminists
against pornography could certainly bring about
more stringent guidelines for its production and
distribution.
Donnerstein and Linz suggest in
their study of 1984, that warnings (much like the
Surgeon General's on cigerette packages) could
accompany pornographic films as to the possible
detrimental social effects of repeated viewings.43
Regulations concerning the size and number of
films playing on pornographic "strips" in major
cities could be instituted.
Indeed any number of
steps could be taken to lower the status of
violent pornography.
Of course, any type of government regulation
is the nightmare of pornographic filmmakers.
But
they are bringing it upon themselves.
Filmmakers
should recognize that they must please not only
the pornographic film audience, but the general
public as well.
If not, the growing number of
those displeased with violent pornography will
call upon the government to rectify the situation.
Since pornographic filmmakers are the ones who
will suffer most from government interference they
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have to make a choice: reform or regulation.
The
response could mean a growing number of acceptable
sexually explicit films or an end to the industry.
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"SILENCING AND SINGING IN SHERWOOD ANDERSON AND
TILLIE OLSEN"
Nancy J. Molyneaux
Tillie Olsen's "Tell Me a Riddle" and
Sherwood Anderson's "Death In The Woods" are
stories about the lives and deaths of two women.
Both Eva, in "Tell Me a Riddle," and Mrs. Grimes,
in Anderson's work, exist in silent solitude,
and
their stories are examples of how the structure of
society shapes the lives of working-cl ass women.
The differences between the two women, however,
are more important in determining the meaning and
significance of their lives. For Eva, solitude
becomes a source of rebirth and rediscovery of the
voice of her revolutionary past, a past that
becomes a living legacy to her husband and
granddaughter. Mrs. Grimes' past contains no
springs of rebirth.
She has so internalized her
imaginative death that it is only through her
physical death that she is able to draw from her
community the attention and tenderness denied to
her in life.
Society provided neither woman with a place
or the time to establish herself as part of a
community.
Eva's time has been taken up by caring
for her large family, and Mrs. Grimes is
constantly burdened with the chore of feeding her
husband, son, and the few scrawny animals they
keep on their farm. Recent research in women's
history has shown that as "women's public role was
transmuted into private service there was a
subsequent loss of public esteem."1 This appears
to be true in the cases of Mrs. Grimes and Eva as
well. Society, with its rigid expectations of
women, binds them to certain duties and places and
then ignores them. Mrs. Grimes, for example, can
be "legally bound into some home"2 and treated
like a slave, first as an orphaned child and later
as a married woman. When she grows older and
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journeys on foot from her home to town for
supplies, "people drive right down a road and
never notice an old woman like that" (p. 39).
Unlike Mrs. Grimes, however, Eva resists society's
denial of her importance.
When her husband
threatens to sell their house she screams at him,
"I am no shadow.
You cannot sell without me."3
Eva fights back against the restrictions placed
upon her, but she cannot escape them entirely.
The demands of their -families have confined
the growth of both women. Eva claims,
of
The love—
the passion
tending— had risen with the
But
need like a torrent...
when the need was done—
oh
the power that was lost in the
painful damming back of what
still surged but had nowhere
to go (p. 428).
As for Mrs. Grimes, "every moment of every
day, as a young girl... was spent feeding
something. Then she married Jake Grimes and he
had to be fed" (p. 41). Their tasks are made even
more difficult by their poverty. Mrs. Grimes'
husband often "left everything for her to manage
and she had no money" (p. 42). Similarly, Eva
reminds her husband that "for every penny I had to
ask— and sometimes... there was nothing.
But
always I_ had to manage" (p. 419).
The struggles of both women to "manage" are
enveloped in silence.
It is no wonder that Eva
has become silent since her daughter recalls
things like "the time you came to school and I
almost died of shame because of your accent"
(p. 431). Mrs. Grimes uses silence to protect
herself from the abuse of her husband and son:
"Whatever happened she never said anything.
That
was her way of getting along. She had managed
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that way when she was a young girl...and ever
since she had married Jake" (p. 44).
The most important difference between the two
women, however, lies in the fact that Eva has not
always been silent.
She feels that
...surely there
was
more,
Still the springs were in her
Somewhere an older
seeking,
power that beat for life (p.
428) .
In her solitude Eva finds "a reconciled peace"
(p. 420) while Mrs. Grimes meets only death. Eva
has both the desire and the means for growth. She
has it in her power to awaken in David, her
husband, the memory of their past dedication to
liberation and to pass that memory on to her
granddaughter, Jeannie.
The source of Eva's
strength lies in the fact that she, unlike Mrs.
Grimes, is not a 'traditional' submissive wife.
The spirit of a Russian revolutionary remains
inside her.
In fact, David says to her, "You
think you are still an orator of the 1905
revolution" (p. 427). Eva remembers the sound of
her own voice, and she is able to rediscover it
when she is dying, while Mrs. Grimes never has a
voice to begin with. Eva is determined to pick up
the beat of her own life and never again be forced
to move to the rhythm of others" (p. 420).
Mrs.
Grimes' entire life, on the other hand, is
dictated by the hunger of both men and animals.
The town butcher, who tries to be friendly to her,
belittles even this occupation with his words, "if
either the husband or son were going to get any of
the liver Che had given her]...he’d see them
starve first" (p. 43).
Another significant difference between the
two women is that while Eva becomes shrunken and
light as her illness progresses, Mrs. Grimes’ body
"in death...looked like the body of some charming
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young girl" (p. 46). One reason -for this is that
Eva, like her granddaughter "let [her]self feel
things" (p. 444). Mrs. Grimes, in contrast, has
stopped feeling:
"she had got past being shocked
early in life" (p. 44). This last statement also
reveals that something inside her, perhaps her
sense of identity, had died when she was a girl
and that her death in the woods was only the
physical manifestation of an imaginative death
which had occured long before.
In her journey through the woods the only
thing Mrs. Grimes encounters besides death is the
harshness and barrenness of the landscape,
symbolizing that of her own life.
In addition,
even the narrator, in concluding this story, does
not understand what her life meant. Anderson sees
Mrs. Grimes merely as a "woman...destined to feed
animal life" (p. 48) rather than a human being
forced into numbness by ignorance and brutality.
In contrast, Eva, through her journey across the
country and eventual reunion with Jeannie, loses
her "reconciled peace" but reaffirms the richness
of her life by retracing her entire past. We meet
her in old age and, like David, go "past the
mother treading at the sewing machine, singing
with the children; past the girl in her wrinkled
prison dress...lifting to him her
awkward...imploring eyes of love" (p. 445) and
return, finally, to the place that made her a
revolutionary and the time "when she first heard
music, a little girl on the road of the village
where she was born" (p. 446). Eva, the night
before her death, "dauntl essly...began a song of
their youth belief" (p. 443) and repeats the words
she has lived to fulfill, "And every life shall be
a song" (p. 443). With those words Eva reveals
how far she has gone beyond Mrs. Grimes, who dies
"softly and quietly" (p. 45) and whose real name
we never know.
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AN ANALYSIS OF YEATS' "A PRAYER FOR MY DAUGHTER"
Martha Michael
Yeats' lifelong struggle with conflicting
desires for involvement and detachment, especially
in relation to the Irish Nationalist Movement,
which, according to Ellmann, made "each poem a
battleground," is evident in what he fears and
wishes for his child in "A Prayer for My
Daughter." Unlike "Easter 1916," where the poet
recognizes both the destructive and transformative
powers of revolution, in "A Prayer for My
Daughter," Yeats focuses only on the negative
effects of conflict and longs to protect his
daughter from all involvement with the raging
storm which is the world. He envisions a choice
between all that Venus had, the laurel and Horn of
Plenty, and what she chose over them, the heat and
violence of Vulcan.
The gloom which the poet experiences in the
opening stanzas of the poem encompasses more than
the worries of an anxious father, for Yeats
imagines in Anne's future the realization of his
apocalyptic vision in a "Second Coming," a
disintegrating world in which the blood-dimmed
tide, born of the murderous innocence of the sea,
threatens the barely protected tower and the halfhidden child.
This is Yeats' vision of the
Ireland in which his daughter would grow up. The
murderous zeal of Irish Nationalists, born of
their innocence, was not to be controlled by the
calculation characteristic of revolutionaries
whose motives were less pure.
In order that she
might live in this world without suffering a fate
similar to that of Helen of Troy and Maud Gonne,
other victims of conflict, Yeats offers his
daughter elements of the woman's Horn of Plenty:
Beauty, Courtesy, Simplicity and Domesticity, and
prays that she will not exchange them, as Venus
and Maud Gonne do in the course of the poem, for
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the bellows and fire of Vulcan, the crippling and
disfiguring violence belonging to the forger of
weapons for the gods.
Venus, Yeats notes, having sprung, like the
storm, from the sea, had no father to govern her,
and so chose poorly in choosing Vulcan. Maud
Gonne repeats Venus’ mistake when she opts to
"Barter that horn and every good/By quiet natures
understood/For an old bellows full of angry wind"
(11. 62-65). As an attentive father, Yeats will
not allow his daughter to make what he sees as a
foolish choice. He wishes her instead the
simplicity of a life marked by courtesy and an
existence uncomplicated by the intellectual
opinions which he hopes she will find "accursed."
Yeats fails to see, however, that, in thus
avoiding intellectual conflict, his daughter will
be neglecting the "monuments of unageing
intellect" by which, as an artificer, she might
gain immortality.
Intell ectualism is not the only
quality which Yeats views askance, for he knows
that if his daughter is excessively beautiful, she
will be judged on and loved for her appearance
alone. Without such beauty, however, Anne might
lack the opportunity, which Leda had, to put on
divine knowledge or power, even though at the same
time, she will be spared the suffering which
results from Leda’s divine communion— Helen.
Throughout the poem, Yeats attempts to offer
Anne the protection which cradle-hood and coverlid
do not provide by wishing a retreat for her from
the tumultuous world of his day. He prays that
her bridegroom, as his replacement, will remove
her to a life of simple domesticity, marked by
custom and ceremony, not revolution.
Yet in this
pleasant, placid life, where Anne, firmly rooted
like a green laurel, and singing like a linnet,
will quarrel and chase only in merriment, she will
be immersed in the sensory world whose temporality
Yeats sought to escape by sailing to Byzantium.
Denied the qualities of an artist or of one who
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communes with the divine, Anne is denied all hope
of immortality as well.
In seeking to preserve
her innocence by protecting her from the frenzy of
the -future, Yeats seems to have retained the naive
escapism of "The Lake Isle of Innisfree," without
the accompanying consideration of the necessity of
involvement with the problems and concerns of the
world. He precludes for Anne any possibility of a
transformation, of a share in the terrible beauty
of MacDonagh, McBride, Connolly and Pearse.
"A Prayer for My Daughter," perhaps, is not
only an expression of protective paternalism on
the part of Yeats but a nostalgic lament for his
country, whose innocence, he felt, was corrupted
by conflict. But Yeats fails to see that each
time he attempts to protect Anne from a
destructive force, he denies her the experience of
that force's transformative power, a power which
he recognizes in other works as elevating his
countrymen.
Ironically Yeats' fears, which
sentence his daughter to a banal existence are as
potentially harmful as the revolutionary zeal of
the Irish Nationalists, although they, like the
heroic fervor of revolutionaries, are born of an
"excess of love."
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SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR'S THEORY OF CHOICE AS SEEN IN
MARGARET ATWOOD'S SURFACING
Maureen McGreevey
I shall place woman in a world of
values and
give her behavior a
dimension of liberty.
I believe
that she has the power to choose
between
the
assertion
of
her
transcendence and her alienation as
object; she is not the plaything of
contradictory drives; she devises
solutions of diverse ranking in the
ethical scale.
Replacing value with
authority,
choice
with
drive;
psychoanalysis offers a substitute,
for
morality— the
concept
of
normality.
Simone De Beauvoir
The Second Sex
This above all, to refuse to be a
victim.
Unless I can do that I can
do nothing.
I have to recant, give
up the
old belief
that I
am
powerless and because of it nothing
I can do will ever hurt anyone. A
lie which was always more disastrous
than the truth would have been. The
word games,
the winning and losing
games are finished; at the moment
there are no others but they will
have to be invented, withdrawing is
no
longer
possible
and
the
alternative is death.
Margaret Atwood
Surfacinq
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Choices
the act of selections to pick the
best or most preferable; to pick out, by
preference, what is available.
Such is the
dictionary’s broad definition of an ambiguous
word. Simone De Beauvoir, however, works out
another, more specific, definition of choice. Her
feminist perspective enables her to present an
almost systematic approach to defining woman's
ability to choose in a "man's world." Atwood's
narrator in Surfacing is a concrete illustration
of De Beauvoir's theory.
This narrator, for
example, experiences much of the oppression,
struggle and bad faith De Beauvoir sees in women's
path to authenticity, but ultimately, the narrator
is able to transcend the bonds of oppression and
enter the realm of active subject rather than of
passive object.
De Beauvoir's definition of choice rests on
two basic concepts: authentic and inauthentic
decision making. Essentially, an authentic choice
is made when a woman acts on her own needs.
(Note that De Beauvoir uses this theory when
speaking about men also. However, for the sake of
focus, I will refer specifically to women.)
In
other words, when a woman makes her own decision
without conforming to or compromising with social
or familial expectations, she has made a decision
of and for herself.
This decision, whatever it
may be, is an exercise in freedom. To act in such
freedom is to explore the boundary free expanse of
individuality.
De Beauvoir, however, also recognizes women's
ability to make many inauthentic choices.
Specifically, women may acquiesce to any number of
predetermined social roles (i.e. wife, mother,
nurturer, counselor).
In so doing, a woman may
either be hiding from herself and her desires or
she may be reacting passively.
That is, she may
be taking cover from an unfamiliar existence or
she may be sensing futility and meaninglessness
and reacting passively.
According to Robert
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Cottrell, De Beauvoir feels "that an awareness of
human liberty creates a sense of anxiety in the
subject and leads him to search for himself in
things. This search is a kind of flight from
self."1 Either reaction renders choice
inauthentic, thus inhibiting a woman’s individual
freedom.
A woman’s freedom to choose, therefore, may
perpetually be hampered.
De Beauvoir once said
that "women are not born but made."2 That is,
women have been seeing themselves through male
eyes for so long that they now accept themselves
as second class. Because everything that surrounds
women is patriarchal (literature, music, science,
law, politics), women have come to accept
themselves through the eyes of men as "the other"
or, as De Beauvoir prefers to call it, as The
Second Sex. Robert Cottrell further explains:
Although women are not the
only others,
the fact remains
that women
are
invariably
defined as Others. For women,
it is
of course
men who
constitute
the
Others.
...Women have
accepted the
male point of view and have
conceived of
themselves as
unessential.
They have by and
large consented to be either
an object or, to the extent
that they incarnate certain of
man's dreams,
an image.
In
either case they exist for men
and not for themselves.3
Overall, De Beauvoir leaves women with only two
essential choices:
she can be "authentic" and
make choices for herself or she can be
"inauthentic" and let choices happen to her.
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At this point Da Beauvoir makes an important
distinction; a woman who acts and chooses in life
is being— for-itself where a woman who is passive
and uninvolved in her own existence is being-initself. Cottrell •further clarifies this point:
Passivity is
the being of
things, whereas choice is that
of human beings.
In Sartre's
famous terminology, often used
by De Beauvoir,
the former
category of being is called
being-in-itself, the latter,
being-for-itself.
To
the
extent
that
human
beings
refuse to assume their freedom
and falsify their existence by
accepting pre-existing roles
that relieve them of the often
painful necessity of choice,
they live
in the mode of
"being-in-itself" rather than
"being-for-itself."
That is
to say, they live a life that
is
not
authentically
human,...their
lives
are
characterized by "immanence"
rather than "transcendence. "4
Obviously, avoiding passivity is not easy,
for it is frequently complicated and painful to
choose.
In order to understand De Beauvoir's
conception of woman as passive object, it is
important to understand De Beauvolir's concept of
situation.
Jean Leighton describes this theory
concisely.
"To become feminine is the equivalent
of defeat.
In becoming a woman the young girl
somehow becomes a lesser human being.
If one
accepts being "the other", one must inexorably
renounce one's real selfhood and exist as an
inessential, derivative, lesser human being. Here
again woman's 'situation' has pernicious
effects."5 Women, in other words, experience many
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inhibitions; in striving for authentic choice.
De
Beauvoir pays particular attention to physical
(specifically menstruation) and historical
inhibitions, but rather than dwelling on the
oppressive nature of these conditions, De Beauvoir
celebrates the dignity of the individual woman and
the historical decision making she has
accomplished. Carol Ascher clarifies this point
in her biography Simone De Beauvoir - A Life of
Freedom:
The Second Sex represents an
enormous
breakthrough
in
describing women’s oppression
within
the
framework
of
choice.
Put most simply,
women have
been
oppressed
throughout history,
not that
this oppression has meant they
have been without freedom to
choose.
Rather, women have
made choices within the limits
set for the as well as, at
times, beyond the confines of
these limits, thus pushing out
for themselves and others.
The great emphasis in De Beauvoir is on the
"way out" of inauthentic choices.
There are
several concrete routes to authenticity, but it
is, De Beauvoir’s definition of choice, her theory
of choice, her theory of situation and her strong
belief in women’s ability to transcend that lead
women away from inauthenticity.
De Beauvoir’s
definition of choice, for example, paves the way
for an authentic existence. She feels that a
woman can only reach her fullest human potential
when she has transcended her inauthenticity and
made choices in her situation.
Because not
choosing is actually making a choice, choices are
inevitable.
Therefore active, authentic decisions
are the key to an existence made in "good faith."
De Beauvoir acknowledges that there are many
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things that may potentially inhibit choices
outside an individual’s situation <i.e. other
people, economic inequities, etc.). However, De
Beauvoir calls women to work within their
circumstances in order to reach the highest
pinnacle of humanity:
"Whatever the
circumstances, we have a freedom of action that
enables us to surmount them." 7
Finally, De Beauvoir has an unwavering faith
in women’s ability to transcend her situation via
a "project." A project is a vigorous, all
encompassing act. Cottrell has again summed up
the theory of transcendence embodied in the notion
of "project":
...man is free and that to
live authentically
he must
assume
his
freedom
by
performing a
vigorous
act
which, in the vocabulary of
existentialism,
is
usually
called a
"project."
When
Beauvoir writes that man is
transcendence,
she
simply
means that by a continuous
series
of
"projects"
man
repeatedly
reaffirms
his
autonomy and fashions his own
life.
Furthermore, what one
transcends,
is always one’s
past and
cannot be
built
without it.
In Beauvoir’s
scheme of things, the future
is usually built by reacting
against the past. Her notion
of
"project"
generally
contains a sense of refusal or
rejecti on.8
The narrator in Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing
explores De Beauvoir’s concept of choice.
She has
been passive (that is, she has not assumed the
64

role of actor in her life), and, in addition, she
has made inauthentic decisions which, as we later
learn, have contributed to her insanity. When her
being begins to struggle against this condition
she begins to recognize the social and familial
expectations which have shaped her. Ultimately,
she recognizes her inauthenticity in being acted
upon and goes insane. Only as a result of a
"rebirth," a plunging into the depths of her
consciousness, is she able to choose and act
authenticall y.
The narrator's detachment and passivity
impressed me as soon as I began the novel. She is
a woman who could look at her lover and her father
with a striking, calculating indifference. At one
point her striking passivity and marked
indifference causes David to remark, "I realize
that you walk around in never-never land... .
She is introduced as a loner who has returned in
quest of a father she doesn't want to see.
In
other words, she is a character who begins
isolated and gradually grows more and more
isolated from her friends and her society.
Consequently, however, she also isolates herself
more and more from the inhibitions they place on
her (i.e. their desire to have her entertain them,
David’s desire to sleep with her, her resistance
to the call for "constant togetherness").
Ultimately, she reaches a pinnacle of being-for—
itself or being for the sake of being.
The narrator’s most poignant moment of
passivity and self-denial occurs when she watches
David and Joe film Anna without her bathing suits
I wanted to run down to the
dock and stop them, fighting
was wrong, we weren’t allowed
to, if we did both sides got
punished in a real war. So we
battled in secret, undeclared,
and after a while I no longer
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•fought back because I never
won.
The only defense was
flight, invisibility.10
Certainly Atwood’s narrator is talking about the
oppression of women in this passage, but she
senses the futility of fighting against a male
oriented existence. Ultimately, she is explaining
why she has chosen the world of passivity rather
than the world of authenticity.
At this point, we see how social, work, and
familial relationships have led this woman to
question her authenticity. Having ventured on
many of what De Beauvoir would label projects, the
narrator has been slowly working towards beingfor-itself. Her canoe trip to search for her
father, her trip blueberry picking, and her
ultimate trip to dive for the picture which would
give her a new "vision," lead her away from her
past towards the life of an active, choosing
individual. Her refusal to marry Joe, her desire
to continue her father’s quest, and her gradual
independence from her group of friends are only a
few examples of how a new woman works out of being
"object" towards being self.
The narrator’s quest for authenticity
culminates in the diving scene. Here she is in
quest of "true vision; at the end, after the
failure of logic." Having reached the "saturation
point," she dives into the lake which ultimately
symbolizes a dive into her own consciousness.
She
adopts the sheltered, weightless feeling of an
unborn fetus floating peacefully and undisturbed:
Pale green,
then darkness,
1ayer after 1ayer, deeper than
before, seabottom;
the water
seemed to have thickened,
in
it pinprick lights flicked and
darted, red and blue, yellow
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and while, and I saw they were
fish, the chasm-dwellers, tins
lined
with
phosphorescent
sparks, teeth neon.
It was
wonderful that I was down so
far, I watched fish, they swam
like patterns on closed eyes,
my
legs
and
arms
were
weightless,
free-floating;
I
almost forgot to look for the
cliff and the shape.11
As a result, she recognizes the ugliness of
inauthenticity.
She remarks: "I killed it.
It
wasn’t a child but it could have been one, I
didn’t allow it."12 She continues to recognize
what inauthentic choice has done to her when she
realizes that "I should have seen that was no
different, it was hiding in me as if in a burrow
and instead of granting it sanctuary I let them
catch it.
I could have said No but I didn’t; that
made me one of them too, a killer."13 (Underlining
mine.)
Here, her most inauthentic act (her
abortion), the memory of which is triggered by the
dive, causes her to lose her sanity.
Essentially,
she loses the self constructed in bad faith and
reconstructs a self made in good faith.
This final project triggers her quest for the
essential, bare self. She turns on all the
potentially oppressive forces she had known
(family, friends, clothing, and shelter) and loses
all the social expectations and dictates.
Reborn
into a primitive, societyless state, she claims,
"[I] no longer have a name.
I tried for all those
years to be civilized but I’m not and I’m through
pretending.
...From any rational point of view I
am absurd; but there are no longer any rational
points of view. "14 Obviously she possesses the
power to act and to shape her own existence, and
ultimately, this new power allows her to dump the
film with all its lies and ugliness.
She tears
down her past. A new person surfacing with the
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ability to choose and the ability to create, she
can now put the past behind her and search for the
choices open to her. Having transcended her
circumstances, she can key on herself, the
individual, as the way back to a social world.
She is no longer an object; rather, she is an
individual with complete freedom:
David and Anna were here, they
slept in the far bedroom;
I
remember
them,
but
indistinctly
and
with
nostalgia,
as
I
remember
people I once knew. They live
in a city now, in a different
time.
I can remember him,
fake husband,
more clearly
though, and now I feel nothing
for him but sorrow;...but I
was not
prepared for
the
average,
its
needless
cruelties and
lies.
My
brother saw the danger early.
To immerse oneself,
join in
the war, or to be destroyed,
though there ought to be other
choi ces. 15
It would seem that Atwood did a thorough
reading of De Beauvoir prior to writing Surfacinq,
for the concepts of struggle, oppression and
authentic choice are inextricably mixed in both
authors’ works.
Both De Beauvoir and Atwood
accept the same definition of choice and both
advocate the great liberating power choice can
have. Most importantly, both writers see that
woman can transcend the bonds of inauthentic,
inhibited choice and enter the realm of active,
authentic decision making.
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Warner

"THE CHASE" TO WILDNESS
Joanne M. Cassetti
If you could be an animal, any animal, what
would you be? I think the first time I was asked
that question was in second grade.
I thought it
was slightly bizarre at the time but later began
to understand the possible significance of it.
Rumor had it that the answer to this question
could be the key to one's entire character.
I
wondered and so I answered immediately that I
would be a Lynx.
I had thought about a cat
because cats are graceful, instinctual and sly.
But, they are also awfully small. Then I saw a
television commercial for a car that pictured a
Lynx as part of the advertisement (or that’s what
my mother called it). And I decided to be
portrayed as a beautiful, big, strong, powerful
cat who could outrun other animals in the Jungle
and who knew how to survive.
The point of this
story is that it never entered my mind to be a
bird-a small, preyed upon, fragile and often caged
animal. Yet, it entered the mind of Alberto
Moravia and is used very effectively in "The
Chase," where Moravia employs the metaphor of a
bird to change perceptions of power and freedom
and therefore to change perceptions of male and
female.
"Everything is wild which is autonomous and
unpredictable and does not depend upon us,"
explains the narrator.1 This is true for animal
life because wildness is acceptable in their
world. But for human life, wildness is forbidden,
especially to women.
It is the human male, the
hunter and the eager who enters the animal world
and acts accordingly.
"My father was leading the
way...he stooped down, picked up something....
There was a bird in the palm of my hand, its
dangling, shattered head crowned with a plume of
already-thickening blood" (p.318). The hunter
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seeks to capture and destroy those species that he
can overpower-- not -for survival but -for sport.
Moravia compares this hunt to the hunt that is
carried on in our society.
The male hunts the
•female and the female responds.
But, instead of
letting the two enjoy being "wild''— that is,
autonomous and unpredictab1e (they) become ’tame’"
(p.319). Or, rather, society teaches the female
to repress her wildness and become like the
hen— "an automaton in the form of a bird;
automatic are the brief rapid steps with which it
moves about; automatic its hard, terse pecking..."
(p .319) .
This being the social order of things, it is
easy for a man to became a hunter and a woman a
hen. Moravia’s narrator, however, rejects this
division. As a child, he will not be taught the
conventions of manhood that exist in our society.
He looks at the bird not as a hunter, but as an
observer:
"It was like watching an animal whose
vitality was rendered more intense by the very
fact of my watching it" (p.318). As a child, he
is not threatened by tears: "I burst into tears
and dropped the corpse on the ground" (p.318).
As a man, however, he is almost trapped in
the conventions of our society. He stops watching
his wife as he watched the bird. Marriage (a
social institution) has tamed her and has,
therefore, prompted him to lose interest. Gone is
that "air of charming unpredictability, of
independence in her way of living" (p.319). Gone
is his innocent ability to smell or therefore
sense "the acrid quality of a wild beast’s lair"
(p.319). When that wildness that so attracted him
to his wife is reawakened, it occurs outside
social convention in the awfully sinful and
exciting realm of an affair. Moravia becomes the
child again. He has the opportunity again to hunt
and cage and conquer.
But he does not. He
understands "that his unknown man who took such
liberties with [his] wife was also attracted by
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wildness" (p.321). He knows that intervention
would amount to nothing "but the shot [his] father
fired at that free, unknowing bird as it perched
on the bough" (p.322). He "had to remember that
wildness, always and everywhere, is directed
against everything and everybody" (p.322).
The analogies that Moravia makes between
hunters and birds and men and women are only the
bases upon which he makes a much more devastating
statement about life. By understanding the
wildness of a bird and similiarly the wildness of
his wife, the narrator changes the meaning of
freedom from patriarchal strength and physical
power to wildness.
In so doing, the bird becomes
as powerful an image as the Lynx or the bear or
any other animal because all are wild and all are
autonomous.
The narrator, therefore, in rejecting the
structural order that forces us to lose our
wildness rejects the conventional image of
manhood.
But his redefinition of manhood and of
human life is a frightening one:
"I had to
remember that wildness always and everywhere, is
directed against everything and everybody"
(p.322). One might rephrase that and say that
everything happens with "No Immediate Cause," the
point being that nature is not perfectly moral nor
divine either.
It is this unpredictability that
is part of our beauty.
By structuring our
wildness, by imposing a system, we insure our
safety. Our nature can no longer be directed
against us, but we ruin our own beauty.
Moravia's characters step out of their
cultural cages and neither of them acts morally.
It is easy to find fault with the wife because in
social terms she is an adulteress.
But why find
fault with the husband? Because, in terms of our
society, he is not a man. He doesn’t intervene;
he doesn’t fight: he doesn’t hunt and destroy.
He
is not a man because he is more of a man. He
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comes to terms, if you will, with his own wants
and needs and begins to see the woman that he
married.
"I felt at that moment her vitality
reached its diapason, just as happens with wild
animals" (p.321). The narrator never condemns her
and he never condemns himself. He only
understands the wildness that is part of every one
of us.
It is important to note that "The Chase" is
written from a male perspective and that the
character from whose perspective it is written is
nameless.
The voice of this man is, I believe,
potential in most men.
It expresses the
understanding that they lack. Withe t this
understanding, they hunt and seize and cage. They
also question, but the questions are forgotten and
the hurts are pushed away because they are men.
They must be men. Similiarly, other nameless
wives escape from their coops to meet nameless
boys who remind them of the days when wildness was
permitted.
The situation is a sad one, but it has arisen
because of our own fear, the fear that some day
our nature may be directed against us and that we
will have no structure capable of restraining it.
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